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Abstract: 
 
On Sunday, 8 May 2011, the British newspaper The Guardian reported the story of a 
boat carrying 72 persons, among them asylum seekers, women and children, which 
left Tripoli (Libya) for the Italian island of Lampedusa at the end of March 2011. 
After 16 days at sea, the boat was washed up on the Libyan shore with only 11 
survivors. In this particular incident, it is remarkable that many of the vessels or 
helicopters, which allegedly failed to save these people, were at that time taking part 
in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector. This has elicited criticism about NATO’s 
and its Member States’ failure to respond to the relevant distress calls and to 
anticipate adequately for an exodus of asylum seekers and refugees from Libya in the 
course of the said Operation. The long list of ‘failures’ in this respect was identified in 
a Report adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Migration, Refugees 
and Displaced Persons of the Council of Europe (29 March 2012).The present paper 
discusses the issues of responsibility for human rights violations arising from this 
incident, including the potential responsibility of NATO. Firstly, there is a succinct 
reference to the primary obligations incumbent upon the States or NATO in this 
regard, namely obligations under human rights law. This is followed by a discussion 
of the secondary rules of international responsibility and their application to this 
particular incident; in particular, the responsibility of each and every State involved in 
the latter as well as of NATO is assessed accordingly. 
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1. Introductory Remarks 
On Sunday, 8 May 2011, the British newspaper The Guardian reported the story of a 
boat carrying 72 persons, among them asylum seekers, women and children, which 
left Tripoli (Libya) for the Italian island of Lampedusa at the end of March 2011. 
After 16 days at sea, the boat was washed up on the Libyan shore with only 11 
survivors.
1
 The President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
reacted immediately to the article by The Guardian and called for an inquiry.
2
 
The inquiry was assigned to Ms Tineke Strik, Member of the Parliamentary 
Assembly. Her Report was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly Committee on 
Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons on 29 March 2012.
3
 According to this 
Report, ‘there were failures at every step of the way and by all key actors’, including 
individual States, such as Libya, Italy, Malta, as well as NATO and its Member 
States.
4
 
The details of the incident are best summarized in the Report as follows: 
The Sub-Saharan passengers, 50 men, 20 women and two babies, were 
accompanied to the boat by Libyan militia. They were boarded by the 
smugglers who removed most of their water supplies and food in order to get 
more people into the boat. After over 18 hours at sea with almost no petrol, 
little food and water and no sight of land, the “captain” called an Eritrean 
Priest living in Italy by satellite phone, sending a distress alert. The Italian 
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) was immediately informed 
and it had the position of the boat plotted by the satellite provider and sent out 
a large number of calls to the ships in the area to look out for the boat. Some 
of these messages clearly indicated that the boat was in distress. It was from 
this point that things went seriously wrong. 
Within a few hours of the first distress signal, a military helicopter hovered 
over the boat and provided water and biscuits and indicated to the passengers 
that it would return. It never did. The boat also encountered at least two 
fishing vessels, neither of which came to its assistance. The boat drifted for 
several days. With no water and food, people started to die. On about the 
                                                 
1
 The Guardian, “Aircraft carrier left us to die, say migrants” (8 May 2011), available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/nato-ship-libyan-migrants>. 
2
 CoE, “President calls for an inquiry into Europe’s role in the deaths of 61 boat people”, 9 May 2011, 
available at <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=6619.> 
3
 See the Report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), “Lives Lost in the 
Mediterranean Sea: Who Is Responsible?” Report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Displaced Persons (29 March 2012), available at <assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2012/20120329 
mig RPT.EN.pdf> [hereinafter: PACE Report]. 
4
 Ibid, para. 133. 
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tenth day of its voyage, when half of the passengers were dead, a large 
aircraft carrier or helicopter-carrying vessel sailed near to the boat, close 
enough for the survivors to see the sailors on board looking at them with 
binoculars and taking photos. Despite obvious distress signals, the naval 
vessel sailed away. The boat eventually washed up on the Libyan shores after 
15 days at sea. The ten survivors were imprisoned, where one of them died 
from lack of medical care. Eventually nine survivors were released after 
which they fled the country.
5
 
What made this case different, beyond the tragedy of the lives lost, was that the boat’s 
distress calls appear to have been ignored also by NATO and its Member States. 
According to the PACE Report, at least two vessels involved in NATO’s Operation 
Unified Protector
6
 were in the boat’s vicinity when the distress call was sent, namely 
the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez (11 miles away) and the Italian ITS Borsini (37 
miles away).
7
 NATO’s only official written reply to the letter of Rapporteur, Ms Strik, 
of 8 December 2011 stated that  
based on a review of existing records in NATO operational headquarters, 
there is no record of any aircraft or ship under NATO command having seen 
or made contact with the small boat in question.
8
  
Even though Ms Strik acknowledged that without full information on this matter it is 
difficult to conclude on the responsibility of NATO or boats under national command, 
it was clear to her that that there was a failure by NATO to react to the distress 
signals. More specifically, she concluded that ‘the Méndez Núñez and the ITS Borsini, 
although in the near vicinity of the boat, failed to go to its assistance, thereby 
engaging the responsibility of both NATO and their respective flagship countries 
(Spain and Italy)’.9 As a result, NATO must take responsibility for the ship’s ignoring 
the calls for assistance from the “left-to-die boat”.10 In addition, the Parliamentary 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, paras. 4 and 5. 
6
 ‘On 22 March 2011, NATO responded to the UN’s call to prevent the supply of “arms and related 
materials” to Libya by agreeing to launch an operation to enforce the arms embargo against the 
country. The next day […] NATO maritime assets stopped and searched any vessel they suspected of 
carrying arms, related materials or mercenaries to or from Libya. In support of UNSCR 1973, NATO 
then agreed to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Libya on 31 March 2011’. The Alliance took 
sole command and control of the international military effort for Libya on 31 March 2011’ The 
Operation ended on 1 November 2011. See at <http.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm> 
7
 Ibid, para. 8. 
8
 Ibid, para. 91. 
9
 Ibid, para 133. 
10
 Ibid, para. 148. 
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Assembly called for further inquiries on the incident by both NATO and the national 
parliaments of the States concerned.
11
 
Moreover, on the judicial level, on 11 April 2012, three NGO’s – La Fédération 
internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH), Groupe d'information et de 
soutien des immigrés (GISTI) and Migreurop – held a press conference to announce 
the filing of a legal complaint against the French military authorities with the 
Procureur de la République du Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, alleging that 
military forces failed to render assistance to a migrant boat within the NATO military 
zone during Operation Unified Protector.
12
 
It is readily apparent that the ‘left-to-die boat’ incident gives rise to numerous 
international legal questions, including questions regarding the search and rescue 
regime under the law of the sea, human rights law etc. It is beyond the ambit of the 
present paper to address all these questions; rather, its focus will be centred on issues 
of responsibility for human rights violations arising from this incident, including the 
potential responsibility of NATO.  
Firstly, there will be a succinct reference to the primary obligations incumbent upon 
the States or NATO in this regard, namely obligations under human rights law. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the secondary rules of international responsibility 
and their application to this particular incident; in particular, the responsibility of each 
and every State involved in the latter as well as of NATO will be assessed 
accordingly. 
2. Human Rights Obligations of States concerning People-at-Sea 
The boat in question was located on the high seas when it made its distress call; the 
high seas are defined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) as 
‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the 
territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an 
archipelagic State’.13 Article 87 of LOSC proclaims the high seas to be free and open 
                                                 
11
 PACE, “PACE Committee Finds a ‘Catalogue of Failures’ that Led to Deaths of 63 People Fleeing 
Libyan Conflict by Sea”, Press Statement (29 March 2012), available online: 
<http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/NewsManager/EMB_NewsManagerView.asp?ID=7567&L=2>. 
12
 FIDH, GISTI and Migreurop concluded that the French military must have had knowledge of the 
distress situation, based upon the following reasons: “(1) Compte tenu de la connaissance de la 
présence et de la localisation (33°45mn de latitude nord et 13°05 mn de longitude est) de ce bateau par 
un avion de reconnaissance français le 27 mars à 14h55. (2) Compte tenu de la présence de l’armée 
française dans le périmètre de 50 milles nautiques, à partir de la localisation de l’embarcation, lors de la 
diffusion du message de détresse le 27 mars à 20h54 (18H54 GMT) par les garde-côtes italiens. (3) 
Compte tenu de l’importante présence de l’armée française dans le périmètre de la diffusion du 
message Hydrolant en date du 28 mars 2011 à 06h06 et de sa diffusion durant les dix jours suivants 
toutes les quatre heures ; see FIDH, GISTI & Migreurop,“Plainte Contre X.” (11 April 2012), p. 18; 
available at <http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/plainte_2012-04_c-armee-francaise.pdf>. See also J. 
Coppens, ‘Search and Rescue at Sea’ in E. Papastavridis & K. Trapp (eds.), Criminal Acts at Sea 
(Centre for Studies and Research, Hague Academy of International Law) [forthcoming] 
13
 See: Article 86 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 397; entered 
into force 16 November 1994; as at 9 August 2013, LOSC has 166 parties, including the EC; see at 
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to vessels of all States, all of which have a range of non-exhaustible freedoms, 
including the freedom of navigation. On the contrary, the territorial sea (or waters) is 
subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State. Article 3 of LOSC recognizes the right 
to establish a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles. In addition, under article 57 of 
LOSC, States may claim an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 miles. There, 
first and foremost, coastal States exercise sovereign rights for the purposes of 
‘exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing’ both its living and non-living 
resources. 
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss the obligations that States bear in 
relation to persons in distress at sea;
14
 suffice it to mention that the duty to assist 
persons in distress at sea is a long-established rule of customary international law. It 
extends to both other vessels and coastal States in the vicinity, and all persons, 
including irregular maritime migrants, remain protected. The duty to rescue has been 
codified in LOSC, which prescribes relevant duties for both the flag and the coastal 
States. First, with regard to flag States, article 98 (1) of LOSC provides that: 
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he 
can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew, or the passengers … to 
render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost … and to 
proceed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need for 
assistance, in so far as such action may be reasonably be expected of him.
 
 
Although the aforesaid provision is located in the Part of LOSC concerning the high 
seas, it is submitted that the duty in question applies in all maritime zones. 
Obligations upon States concerning persons in distress at sea may arise, beyond the 
law of the sea, also from international human rights law. For example, a fundamental 
human right of particular relevance in the present context is the right to life. 
A preliminary, yet paramount question is whether human rights law applies to the 
rescue of persons on the high seas. The protection of human rights extends to persons 
under the jurisdiction of the State parties to the pertinent treaties. It is, however, this 
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ that has aroused considerable controversy in international 
legal discourse.
15
 In the present milieu, it is questioned whether the master of the 
vessel rescuing migrants on the high seas or the coastal State that coordinates the 
                                                                                                                                            
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea> (last visited 18 September 2013) [hereinafter: LOSC]. 
14
 On the rules on rescue-at-sea see E. Papastavridis, The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: 
Contemporary Challenges to the Legal Order of the Oceans, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 294-300 
and R Barnes, ‘The International Law of the Sea and Migration Control’, in V. Mitsilegas and B. Ryan 
(eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control (The Hague: Brill, 2010), 103.  
15
 From the very rich and recent jurisprudence on extraterritorial jurisdiction and human rights see inter 
alia G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Extra-Territorial Reach of Human Rights Obligations: A Brief Perspective 
on the Link to Jurisdiction’ in L. Boisson de Chazournes and M. Kohen (eds), International Law and 
the Quest for its Implementation. Liber Amicorum Vera Gowlland-Debbas (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2010), 293 and M. Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles 
and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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rescue operation are bound by human rights obligations, even though these acts do not 
take place in their territory. 
The main international human rights treaties on civil and political rights, such as the 
ICCPR and the ECHR, conceive state responsibility for securing the rights they 
contain essentially in terms of the State’s ‘jurisdiction’. Similarly, under the 
Convention against Torture (CAT), the State is obliged to take measures to prevent 
acts of torture ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’.16 Thus, it is necessary to 
establish whether a situation falls within the State’s ‘jurisdiction’ before the 
obligations in these instruments are in play.
17
 This notion of jurisdiction ‘relates 
essentially to a question of fact, of actual authority and control that a State has over a 
given territory or person. “Jurisdiction”, in this context, simply means actual power, 
whether exercised lawfully or not, nothing more, and nothing less’.18 ‘Factivity’ in 
this regard ‘creates normativity’19 or in the words of the European Court of Human 
Rights, ‘de facto control gives rise to de jure responsibilities’.20 
In the context of the present enquiry, i.e. on the high seas, it is apposite to refer to the 
Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Medvedyev v. France case: 
even though the Respondent did not dispute the jurisdiction of the Court under article 
1 of the Convention, in spite of the fact that the interception occurred on the high seas, 
i.e. extraterritorially of France, the Grand Chamber held that ‘as this was a case of 
France having exercised full and exclusive control over the Winner and its crew, at 
least de facto, from the time of its interception, in a continuous and uninterrupted 
manner until they were tried in France, the applicants were effectively within France’s 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention’.21 
More recently, in the Hirsi case (2012), which concerned Somalian and Eritrean 
migrants who had been intercepted on the high seas by the Italian authorities and sent 
back to Libya, the Grand Chamber held that ‘in the period between boarding the ships 
of the Italian armed forces and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the 
applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the 
                                                 
16
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
17
 See R. Wilde, ‘Triggering State Responsibility Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human 
Rights Treaties’, 40 Israel Law Review (2007), 503, at 506. 
18
 M. Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in 
Human Rights Treaties’, 8 Human Rights Law Review (2008), 411, at 429. 
19
 M. Sheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in F. 
Coomans et al. (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004), 73 at 
81. 
20
 ECtHR, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, Application No. 61498/08, Order of 30 June, 
2009; para. 88. 
21
 See: Medvedyev et al. v. France, Judgment of 29 March 2010 (Grand Chamber, Application No. 
3394/03); para 67 (emphasis added). See also case note by E. Papastavridis in 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2010), 867. 
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Italian authorities…Accordingly, the events giving rise to the alleged violations had 
fallen within Italy’s jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1’.22 It follows from the 
foregoing that the Convention extends to the high seas, provided that the State 
exercises effective control through its organs over the persons concerned.
23
 
Hence, it is indubitable that, in principle, human rights law applies to the rescue of 
such persons; in addition, international refugee law and in particular, the prohibition 
of non-refoulement applies also on the high seas and thus binds the flag State, which 
proceeds to the rescue of the migrants. The principle of non-refoulement is primarily 
enshrined in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention
24
 and prescribes, broadly, 
that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face 
persecution, other ill-treatment, or torture.
25
 Even though the US Supreme Court 
found in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council (1993) that the Refugee Convention and 
article 33 fall short of applying on the high seas,
26
 the subsequent decision of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this case
27
 as well as various declarations 
and resolutions in different fora,
28
 State practice
29
 and scholarly opinion
30
 have 
                                                 
22
 Hirsi Jamaa ao v Italy App no 27765/09 (EctHR, Grand Chamber Judgment of 23 February 2012), 
paras 81 and 82 [hereinafter: Hirsi case]. On the Hirsi case see M. Giuffre, ‘Waterdown Rights on the 
High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy (2012)’ 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2012), 728–50. 
23
 See in general E. Papastavridis, ‘European Convention of Human Rights and the Law of the Sea: the 
Strasbourg Court in Unchartered Waters?’, in M. Fitzmaurice & P. Merkouris (eds.), The Interpretation 
and Application of the European Convention of Human Rights: Legal and Practical Implications 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2013), 117. 
24
 Art. 33 (1) reads as follows: ‘1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’; 
see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954) 189 UNTS 137. 
25
 On this principle see the excellent treatise on the issue by E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, ‘The 
Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’ in E. Feller et al (eds), Refugee 
Protection in International Law (2001) 87 [hereinafter: Lauterpacht/Bethlehem]. 
26
 See: Sale, Acting Commissioner, INS v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. (1993), 2549. 
27
 See Haitian Center for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (13 March 1997). 
28
 See e.g. the General Principles endorsed by the IMO Facilitation Committee, which make specific 
reference to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of refugee, see: 1965 Convention on Facilitation 
of International Maritime Traffic, as amended, 10 January 2002, Section 4.2. See also inter alia 
UNCHR EXCOM Conclusion No. 6 (XXVIII), at para (c) and Conclusion No. 97 (2003). 
29
 See B. Frelick, “‘Abundantly Clear’’: Refoulement,’ 19 Georgetown Journal of International Law 
(2005), at 679. 
30
 See inter alia Justice Blackmun, Dissenting Opinion, reprinted in 6 International Journal of Refugee 
Law (1994), 71, G. Goodwin-Gill’s ‘Comment’ in 6 International Journal of Refugee Law (1994), 102, 
L.D. Rosenberg, ‘The Courts and Interception: The US’ Interdiction Experience and its Impact on 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers’, 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal (2002-3), 199. 
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adequately substantiated the thesis that non-refoulement is prohibited wherever it 
takes place and not only within a State’s borders. 
Nevertheless, it is not so evident when these treaties start applying. In other words, at 
which point the persons in distress are considered as subject to the jurisdiction of the 
States concerned? Having in mind the prerequisite of ‘control’, it is doubtless that 
these persons would be under the jurisdiction of the flag State of the rescuing State 
vessel. On the contrary, it is questioned whether the same conclusion can be drawn in 
cases of rescue operations conducted by private vessels; the flag State has mainly a 
due diligence obligation and the assessment of any failure by the Master of the vessel 
to provide assistance would inevitably be made ex post facto. This is possible by 
virtue of the duty of the master to record any reason for failing to render assistance.
31
 
Also, it is questioned whether the coastal State which receives a distress call and is 
aware of the location of persons in distress exercises control over these persons with 
the result that the latter come under its jurisdiction. On the one hand, it is difficult to 
speak of a de jure control that the coastal State exercises a priori over vessels and 
persons within its search and rescue zone; the latter is not a maritime zone, in which 
coastal States exercise ipso jure sovereignty or jurisdiction. Coastal States have only 
an obligation to ‘promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an 
adequate and effective search and rescue service’ therein under article 98 (2) of 
LOSC. Consequently, it is submitted that the coastal State lacks de jure control, ergo 
a priori jurisdiction over all vessels and persons located in its search and rescue zone. 
On the other hand, a different conclusion can be drawn in cases of distress calls that 
are received and acknowledged by the Rescue Coordination Centre of the coastal 
State; in such cases, arguably, a long distance de facto control between that State, 
which received the call and the persons who sent it, may be established. Indeed, the 
life of the persons in distress depends on the behaviour of the recipient State, which, 
being aware of the location of the vessel in distress, exerts certain control over these 
persons. Hence, these persons may be considered within the jurisdiction of the coastal 
States concerned in this regard. 
Having addressed the question when persons in distress at sea come under the 
jurisdiction of States for the purposes of human rights law, it is time to see which 
human rights exactly are applicable in the present context. Firstly, as has recently 
accepted the Strasbourg Court in the Al-Skeini v. UK case, human rights can be 
“divided and tailored”;32 thus, in cases, such as the one discussed above, i.e. when 
there are only distress calls and not yet an actual rescue operation, the only human 
right that come to the fore is the right to life. 
 
 
                                                 
31
 See Chapter V, reg 10(a) of SOLAS Convention. 
32
 See Al-Skeini v. UK, Application No. 55721/07, Grand Chamber Judgment of 7
th
 July 2011, para. 
137. 
RLI Working Paper No. 10 
 
 
11 
 
In respect of the right to life, this is set forth in article 2 of ECHR as follows: 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court 
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of 
this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than 
absolutely necessary: (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained [...] 
In the context of ECHR, Article 2 forbids States intentionally to deprive someone of 
his or her life unless it is ‘no more than absolutely necessary’, amongst others, ‘in 
defence of any person from unlawful violence’ or ‘in order to effect a lawful arrest’. 
Therefore, when States engage in law enforcement operations at sea should do ‘no 
more than absolute necessary ... to effect a lawful arrest’. As held in the landmark 
case of McCann and others v. United Kingdom (1995),
33
 deprivations of life must be 
subject to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, 
taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually 
administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances. In addition, as held by 
the Court in Osman v United Kingdom (1999),
34
 Article 2 requires States not only to 
restrain from causing death, but also to take measures to protect the lives of 
individuals within their jurisdiction. Furthermore, this article, combined with article 1 
of the Convention implies that the State should put in place a proper official, 
independent and public investigation into any death which may have been caused by 
agents of the State. 
When the persons are rescued, it is indisputable that both flag and coastal States are 
obliged to abide by the principle of non-refoulement, which is also a fundamental 
component of the treaty as well as customary prohibition of torture, cruel, inhumane, 
and degrading treatment or punishment.
35
 Moreover, as it was evidenced in the 
Medvedyev v. France case (2010), the right to liberty and security (e.g. article 5 
ECHR and article 9 of ICCPR) comes into play in this regard. 
3. The Rules on International Responsibility and the Non-Rescue of the 
‘Boat-People’ 
Under the law of State Responsibility, every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails its international responsibility,
36
 while the conditions required to establish such 
                                                 
33
 See McCann and others v. United Kingdom (1995), 27 September 1995, EHHR Series A No. 324. 
34
 See Osman v United Kingdom Application No. 87/1997/871/1083, Grand Chamber Judgment of 28 
October 1998, 29 EHRR 245 
35
 See Lauterpacht/Bethlehem, at 144. 
36
 See article 1 of ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN 
General Assembly Official Records; 56th Session, Supp. No. 10 at UN. Doc A/56/10; at 31 
[hereinafter: ASR]; available at: <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.> 
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an act are twofold: first, the conduct in question must be attributable to the State under 
international law; second, for responsibility to attach to the act of the State, the 
conduct must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation in force for that 
State at that time.
37
 Thus, the whole edifice of State Responsibility is premised upon 
the existence of a primary rule establishing an obligation under international law for a 
State.
38
  
Similarly, the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
39
 largely 
follow the model of the Articles on State Responsibility. As in the case of States, the 
attribution of conduct to an international organization is one of the two essential 
elements for an internationally wrongful act to occur. A second essential element is 
that conduct constitutes the breach of an obligation under international law incumbent 
upon the international organization.
40
 The obligation may result either from a treaty 
binding the international organization or from any other source of international law 
applicable to the organization.
41
  
In the context of the present enquiry, the questions to be addressed concern the 
alleged responsibility of the flag States and the coastal States as well as of NATO.   
3.1 Flag States involved in the incident 
According to the available information, the boat in distress had been initially assisted 
by a military helicopter there have been reports that it must have been 
Italian
42
while it had encountered two fishing boats, one flying the Italian flag and 
the other the Tunisian one, which never came of assistance.
43
 In addition, allegedly, 
there had been three warships in the vicinity: the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez (11 
                                                 
37
 See article 2 of ILC Articles. 
38
 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001- II), Part Two, at 31 [hereinafter: ASR 
Commentary]. On the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ rules see also U. Linderfalk, 
‘State Responsibility and the Primary-Secondary Rules Terminology’, 78 Nordic Journal of 
International Law (2009), 53. 
39
 See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (2011); ILC Report, Sixty-
Third Session, UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011), pp. 50–170 [hereinafter: ARIO]; available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf.> Resolution 
66/100 of 9 December 2011of the GA took note of the articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, presented by the International Law Commission, the text of which was annexed to the 
resolution. 
40
 See article 4 of ARIO. 
41
 As the International Court of Justice noted in its Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, international organizations “are bound by 
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions 
or under international agreements to which they are parties”; I.C.J. Reports 1980, pp. 89–90, para. 37.   
42
 See PACE Report, at para 28. 
43
 See ibid, at paras 36-38. 
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miles away), the Italian ITS Borsini (37 miles away)
44
 and a French vessel.
45
 None of 
them assisted the boat people.  
The responsibility of each of the flag States involved will be analyzed separately; 
needless to say that any conclusion drawn will be based solely on the evidence, such 
as testimonies, referred to in the PACE Report.
46
 
3.1.1 The Military Helicopter 
It is reported that a military helicopter gave water and biscuits to the people in 
distress; it failed, however, to provide any further assistance to the latter as well as to 
inform other maritime or aeronautical assets or search and rescue services about the 
location of the vessel.
47
 There are suspicions that the helicopter was Italian and it 
probably came from an Italian warship in the vicinity. Indeed, the PACE Report links 
it, albeit without certainty, with the ITS Borsini, which had a helicopter capacity.
48
 
In applying the rules on State responsibility, it is submitted that the presence of the 
helicopter and the initial assistance provided to the persons in distress had as a result 
that these persons were under the ‘de facto control’, hence, under the jurisdiction of 
the State of the registry of the helicopter. The omission to provide any further 
assistance was clearly attributed to that State as well as it did constitute a breach of 
the positive obligation set forth by the right to life under article 2 of ECHR and article 
6 of ICCPR. Thus, there is no doubt as to the responsibility of the State concerned, 
allegedly Italy, for the failure to provide assistance to the persons in distress. 
3.1.2 Commercial Shipping 
According to the survivors, during their voyage and after they had run out of fuel, 
they encountered a number of fishing vessels: 
[t]hey saw at least one fishing boat flying the Italian flag and another flying a 
Tunisian flag. As they attempted to approach the Italian boat the fishermen 
drew in their nets and sailed away … The Tunisians told them that they were 
navigating in the wrong direction and gave them new directions for 
Lampedusa. When the people on the boat told the fishermen that they had run 
                                                 
44
 See ibid, at para 8. 
45
 Ibid, at paras 85-57 
46
 With regard to the overall credibility of the testimonies; see ibid, at paras. 49-50. 
47
 Ibid, at paras 92-96. 
48
 Ibid, at para. 112. However, later in her Report, Ms Strik mentions that the helicopter might have 
come from the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez (paras 137-142). Thus, we cannot be certain as to the 
identity of the flag State involved. Noteworthy is that all the stakeholders involved (Italy, Spain and 
NATO) either refuse or remain silent on the identity of helicopter (para. 142). 
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out of fuel, the fishermen replied that they had none to give them. They then 
just “ran away from us.49  
Furthermore, according to Ms Strik,  
[i]t is also unclear why the Cypriot supply vessel Sea Cheetah did not 
intervene. From the analysed telephone recordings provided by the Rome 
MRCC, I understand that it was not far from the boat’s location on 27 
March 2011. However, apparently the Sea Cheetah took no action, nor did 
the Rome MRCC ask it to do so.
50
 
In ascertaining the responsibility of the flag States of the private vessels that, 
allegedly, failed to render assistance, the first issue is the attribution of this failure to 
the flag States concerned. It is the view of the present author that the omission as such 
cannot be attributed to the respective States, in casu, Italy, Tunisia and Cyprus. The 
ground is that the Master of the private vessel is neither a de jure organ (article 4 of 
the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ASR), nor a de 
facto organ (article 8 ASR) of the State.
51
 More pertinently, it cannot be considered as 
a ‘person exercising elements of governmental authority’ pursuant to article 5 of 
ASR. According to the ASR Commentary, 
if it is to be regarded as an act of the State for purposes of international 
responsibility, the conduct of an entity must accordingly concern 
governmental activity and not other private or commercial activity in which 
the entity may engage.
52
 
The rescue-at-sea has been from times immemorial deemed as a private maritime 
tradition.
53
 
Inextricably linked with the question of attribution is the preliminary issue of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law. It is submitted that the flag States 
would not incur responsibility for the failure of the vessels to assist the persons in 
distress, since the latter never came under the ‘jurisdiction’ of the States involved. 
The establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction for human rights purposes requires 
the ‘spatial’ or ‘personal’ control of the State concerned, which, in turn, presupposes 
the conduct of de jure or de facto State organs. 
                                                 
49
 See PACE Report, at paras. 36-7. 
50
 Ibid, at para. 103. 
51
 For further analysis of this issue see E. Papastavridis, ‘Rescuing People at Sea: The Responsibility of 
Flag and Coastal States under International Law’, in G. Goodwin-Gill, Ph. Weckel (eds.), International 
Migration (Centre for Studies and Research, Hague Academy of International Law) [forthcoming]; 
available at Working Paper Series Social Science Research Network (27 September 2011), 18, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1934352>. 
52
 See ASR Commentary, at 43. 
53
 See Papastavridis, supra note 51, at 18.  
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Exceptionally and only in the case that the flag States had been informed about the 
boat in distress and had instructed their vessels not to render assistance, the persons 
would have been under the ‘jurisdiction’ of those States. In that case, the Master could 
have been considered as a ‘de facto organ’ in accordance with article 8 of ASR and 
thus the failure to render assistance would have been attributed to the flag State. 
Consequently, the responsibility of the latter for the violation of the right to life might 
have arisen. Nevertheless, it is not the usual practice for commercial shipping to 
inform flag State authorities in respect of such matters. 
3.1.3 The Warships in the Vicinity 
According to the PACE Report, 
[t]he survivors all concur that on what could have been day 10 of their trip 
they drifted close to a very large military vessel. It was possibly an aircraft 
carrier or at least a vessel with helicopter facilities, with helicopters on board 
and possibly also fighter jets. The ship was of an off-white or light grey 
colour and the boat was close enough for them to see people on board 
wearing different coloured military uniforms. …“Some were looking through 
binoculars and others were taking pictures of us.” …The ship remained at a 
distance, so the people in the boat started shouting and waving their hands. 
“They’re just watching that there are dead children and other 
bodies.”….There was no communication from the ship and no assistance was 
provided. After a short while, the military vessel sailed away, abandoning the 
stranded boat.
54
 
There had been also other vessels in the area, besides the aforementioned large 
military vessel, which must have received the alert message of the Rome Maritime 
Rescue Coordination Centre (Rome MRCC). Indeed, the Italian Naval Fleet 
Command (CINCNAV) in a call made to the Rome MRCC confirmed that a military 
vessel under NATO command was located around 11 miles away from the boat in 
distress: the Spanish naval vessel Méndez Núñez.
55
 Also, ‘during a telephone 
conversation between the CINCNAV and the Rome MRCC, shortly after referring to 
the Méndez Núñez, mention is made of the Italian vessel ITS Etna as being within the 
specified region as well as the ITS Borsini. In information provided by NATO, it is 
confirmed that the ITS Borsini was 37 nautical miles away, but that the ITS Etna was 
much further away (155 miles).’56 
As regards human rights law, it seems difficult to sustain the argument that the flag 
States of the Méndez Núñez and the ITS Borsini had exercised any kind of ‘control’ 
over the persons on the boat so as to bring about the relevant human rights 
obligations. A distress call to all vessels in a wide area does not suffice to establish 
‘jurisdiction’ of all flag States over the persons concerned. Apparently, different is the 
                                                 
54
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case of the other military vessel: allegedly, the latter had visual contact with the ‘boat 
people’, it was aware of the situation, namely that people, amongst them, children, 
had been already dead, and stayed aloof. Arguably, the visual contact and the 
awareness of the situation brings the ‘boat people’ under the jurisdiction of the 
(unknown) flag State of the military vessel. Moreover, the failure to assist them is 
attributed to the flag State and amounts to a breach of article 2 of ECHR or article 6 of 
ICCPR. 
3.2 Coastal States Involved 
The coastal States involved in the present incident were Italy, which was the first 
State to be alerted, Malta, which was informed of the incident and Libya, in whose 
SAR zone the boat was located when it sent the distress message. In addition, Libya 
was the State from where the vessel departed and to where it returned. 
3.2.1 Italy 
According to the PACE Report, the Rome MRCC was notified on 27 March by Father 
Zerai about the boat and it immediately undertook several steps to coordinate their 
rescue: first, it tried to contact the boat. From the audio records, it is clear that the 
conversation was interrupted before any substantial exchange could take place. It also 
sent out a number of messages, using different networks and satellites, to make sure 
they reached a maximum number of vessels in the area. In addition, it launched a 
DISTRESS call on the Inmarsat-C Gateway Enhanced Group Call (EGC) addressed 
to all ships transiting in the Sicily Channel. Finally, it informed Malta MRCC by 
phone and later by fax as well as the NATO headquarters allied command in Naples 
and FRONTEX. Noteworthy also is that ROME MRCC kept sending this distress 
message every 4 hours for 10 days.
57
  
Nevertheless, Italy never initiated a search and rescue operation as such. The 
explanation given to Ms Strik is the following: 
The Rome MRCC stated that during the period in question their assets were 
working around the clock, with between 20 to 25 incidents requiring attention 
on just one day. Between 26 and 28 March, the Italian authorities were 
engaged in incidents involving approximate 4 300 people. Over 2 200 of 
these people were assisted at sea and around 2 000 were rescued from distress 
situations. From the Rome MRCC’s perspective, priority needed to be given 
to the large number of incidents occurring within Italy’s SAR zone rather 
than incidents occurring elsewhere. The Italian authorities did not consider 
themselves as the responsible authority, as the boat was not located in their 
SAR zone. They explicitly let me know that if this had been the case, they 
would have certainly co-ordinated the SAR operation.
58
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With regard to Italy’s responsibility, even if we assume that the persons came under 
the ‘long distance de facto control’ of Italy and thus under its jurisdiction, Italy had to 
a large extent abided by its positive obligations concerning the right to life. It did take 
all the measures available under the present circumstances to notify all the relevant 
stakeholders (vessels, States, international organizations) and to cooperate in the 
rescue of these persons. In addition, it lacked the necessary resources, i.e. available 
search and rescue units, to send them on the scene. Hence, even though the omission 
is attributable to Italy, the latter State should not be held in violation of the right to life 
(article 2 ECHR). 
3.2.2 Malta  
The Rescue Coordination Centre of Malta was also informed of the boat’s situation. 
Nevertheless, it did nothing to assist the persons in distress. According to the PACE 
Report, 
Malta MRCC noted that its helicopters, being one-engine assets, were not 
able to travel such long distances and get back and that its boats usually 
required around 20 to 24 hours to reach the end of its SAR zone. The Maltese 
search and rescue authorities told me they had never considered starting a 
search and rescue operation, as they considered the Rome MRCC, the first 
MRCC informed, to be responsible on the basis of maritime law, and indeed 
the Rome MRCC had not requested them to start a search and rescue 
operation.
59
 
The problems that Malta faces regarding its extensive SAR zone are beyond the 
compass of the present Chapter.
60
 Nevertheless, in the present case, it would be far-
fetched to argue in the first place that the ‘boat people’ have come under Maltese 
jurisdiction and consequently to hold Malta in violation of the right to life. As 
explained above, people within a search and rescue zone do not ipso facto fall within 
the jurisdiction of the respective coastal State, but there must be a de facto link 
established between these persons and the coastal State concerned. 
3.2.3 Libya  
It goes without saying that Libya had a central role in the incident under scrutiny. 
Firstly, the unseaworthy dinghy full of people departed from Libya; more importantly, 
it was reported that Libyan soldiers did not prevent them from leaving and even 
accompanied them to their rubber dinghy. Secondly, the distress call was sent when 
the boat was within the Libyan SAR zone, thus technically the Tripoli MRCC was the 
responsible RCC. Last but not least, οn 10 April, when the boat was washed up on the 
rocks close to Zilten, the 10 survivors were immediately arrested by the Libyan 
authorities, their possessions were confiscated and they were imprisoned. Due to the 
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lack of appropriate medical assistance, one of the survivors died in prison. They were 
then transferred from one prison to another resulting to the deterioration of their 
medical condition.
61
 
As regards the potential responsibility of Libya for the violation of human rights law, 
the following remarks are in order: on the one hand, there is no doubt that the ‘boat 
people’ were under the jurisdiction of Libya and hence, they were under the 
protection afforded by human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR.
62
 Libya had thus to 
protect their right to life and not force them to leave in an unseaworthy dinghy. This 
conduct of Libyan authorities was also in violation of the UN Smuggling Protocol 
(2000), to which Libya is a party and which requires States to criminalise the 
smuggling of migrants (article 6) and cooperate to suppress such activities at sea 
(article 7).
63
 
Also, Libya was in violation of the prohibition of non-refoulement under under article 
7 of the ICCPR
64
 and under customary law.
65
 Moreover, the removal of 72 non-
Libyans with the assistance of Libyan officials could amount to a violation of the 
prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, which is considered as part of the article 
7 of the ICCPR. Indeed, when commenting on article 7 of the Covenant, the Human 
Rights Committee stated that “States parties must not expose individuals to the danger 
of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to 
another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.”66  
It is readily apparent that upon the return of the ‘boat people’ Libya acted again in 
defiance of international human rights law. The lack of any medical treatment to the 
survivors, their imprisonment and their maltreatment in the prison amounted to a 
breach of the right of life (article 6 of ICCPR) one person passed away in the 
prison the prohibition of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment (article 7 of 
ICCPR) and the right to liberty and security (article 9 of ICCPR). 
The question is whether the aforementioned acts were attributable to Libya in view of 
the situation of armed conflict therein. The answer should be affirmative, since they 
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were conducted by their de jure organs (article 4 of ASR), while the existence of an 
internal armed conflict does not absolve the State from its responsibility arising from 
acts of its organs;
67
 even if the acts in question were attributed to the insurrectional 
movement (the Libyan Transitional National Council), Libya would also be held 
responsible in view of the principle of the continuity of the State and article 10 (1) of 
ASR.
68
  
3.3 NATO 
It is obvious that one of the main reasons that the PACE Report has attained such 
publicity is its conclusion that NATO should assume responsibility for the failure to 
render assistance to the ‘boat people’ in distress. Holding such organization not only 
politically accountable, but also legally responsible for that omission certainly has 
interesting ramifications for NATO itself and for other international organizations 
engaged in maritime operations (e.g. EU Operation Atalanta). As evidenced in the 
PACE Report, the NATO headquarters in Naples were informed about the incident by 
the Rome MRCC on 27 March;
69
 according to NATO, however, ‘the contents of the 
message they received from the Rome MRCC in the evening of 27 March were 
unclear’.70 Indeed, NATO never replied to this call,71 while it refused the involvement 
of vessels under its command in the incident. In addition, NATO officials stressed 
that  
[i]n all cases, NATO warships did everything they could to respond to 
distress calls and provide help when necessary. In addition, through 
coordination with national authorities, NATO has indirectly facilitated the 
rescue of many hundreds more. Commanders of warships under NATO 
command were, and remain, fully aware of their obligations under the 
International Law and Law of the Sea and responded appropriately.
72
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To hold NATO responsible for the omission to render assistance to the boat in 
distress, it would require finding, firstly, this omission attributable to NATO itself and 
not its Member States and secondly, that it did amount to a breach of an international 
obligation of NATO as such (article 4 ARIO). On the question of attribution in cases 
of operations under Chapter VII, such as Operation Unified Protector, reference 
should be made to article 7 of ARIO, which enunciates that ‘[t]he conduct of an organ 
of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the 
disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international 
law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over 
that conduct’. It is true that article 7 has aroused much doctrinal controversy as well 
as divergent international decisions.
73
 Without dwelling on this issue, it seems that 
both international legal doctrine and the majority of international decisions consider 
that the decisive criterion for the attribution of the wrongful conduct to either the 
international organization or its Member States lies in who exerts effective control 
over the act or omission in question or, in the view of the author, who has the 
decision-making authority over the act or omission.  
In the present case, the key question is whether the decision to leave the ‘boat people’ 
without assistance was made by the NATO Commander itself or by the Commanding 
Officer of the warship concerned. If the former, the conduct would be attributable to 
NATO and if the latter, to the flag State. In principle, this would depend on the Rules 
of Engagement of the Operation Unified Protector, which set forth the operational 
procedures to be followed by the warships in the context of the Operation and whether 
the operational command in such cases would rest with NATO or the contributing 
Member State. Such information, however, is not generally available to public and as 
stated above, NATO has refuted any involvement in the incident. 
To the knowledge, though, of the author, NATO’s position concerning rescue at sea is 
that the Member States alone are responsible and not NATO, even though the 
warships may be under command of NATO. Member States alone are also 
responsible for the actions ex post facto. A NATO commander cannot give any order 
concerning the rendering of assistance or its aftermath. This is also the view of 
individual Member States, i.e. that NATO has no formal responsibility or any role to 
render assistance, which remains the responsibility of individual States.
74
 
With regard to human rights law in particular and besides the issue of attribution, it is 
a question whether NATO as such is bound by the obligations under human rights 
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law, e.g. the right to life. Apparently, NATO would be bound by the fundamental 
provisions of humanitarian law and human rights law, including the right to life, in the 
context of its mandate in Libya. However, safeguarding lives on the high seas is not 
part of the mandate of NATO and consequently, it falls outside the scope of the 
normative framework governing Operation Unified Protector. This entails that NATO 
cannot be responsible for any violation of the right to life, since it is not bound by 
such obligation with regard to the ‘boat people’ in question.  
It falls upon the flag States of the vessels participating to render assistance to the 
persons concerned as well as to protect their right to life. In the previous part, the 
ostensible responsibility of each flag State involved was discussed. It is well worth 
mentioning here that these flag States could invoke that they were under NATO 
command and, hypothetically, their warships were not able to render assistance to the 
persons in distress due to their mandate. Apparently, even if the warships concerned 
were not in the position to assist these persons by themselves, this does not absolve 
their flag States from their obligation to notify and cooperate with other States and 
assets in this regard. 
This notwithstanding, these States could claim that were acting under a Chapter VII 
Resolution and thus, by virtue of article 103 of the UN Charter, their obligations 
under the LOSC and the SOLAS Conventions were superseded.
75
 A counter-argument 
on this would be that as regards human rights law, the right to life is such a 
fundamental right, attaining the status of a peremptory norm, which cannot be 
superseded or, in the alternative, in the light of the Al-Jedda v. UK case, it calls for a 
different interpretation of the relevant Resolutions.
76
  
In conclusion, the responsibility of NATO in relation to the ‘left-to-die boat’ incident 
should not be lightly presumed. As the previous analysis demonstrated, NATO as 
such was under no obligation to rescue these persons on the high seas and thus it 
cannot incur any responsibility under international law. This however does not 
exonerate its Member States for their individual responsibility, qua flag States, in this 
regard. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The ‘left-to-die boat’ incident revealed the inadequacies, the lack of resources or even 
the inertia of a number of actors (States, international organizations, private mariners) 
to rescue people in distress at sea. Indeed, many opportunities for saving the lives of 
those persons were lost. Of course, this incident is just the tip of the iceberg, since an 
incredible number of silent tragedies occur every year in the Mediterranean. Based 
only on confirmed cases, it is estimated that more than 1 500 lives have been lost in 
the Mediterranean in 2011.
77
   
In this particular incident, it is remarkable that many of the vessels or helicopters, 
which allegedly failed to save these people, were at that time taking part in NATO’s 
Operation Unified Protector. This has elicited criticism about NATO’s and its 
Member States’ failure to respond to the relevant distress calls and to anticipate 
adequately for an exodus of asylum seekers and refugees from Libya in the course of 
the said Operation.
78
 The long list of ‘failures’ in respect identified in the respective 
PACE Report was analyzed through the lens of the rules on international 
responsibility.  
The conclusions drawn in relation to the responsibility of the relevant actors varied; 
for example, on the one hand, it was found that in some situations, the flag States of 
the warships that encountered the boat were responsible for not protecting their right 
to life; on the other hand, it was submitted that NATO did not incur any 
responsibility, primarily because of the fact that NATO as such was under no relevant 
obligation under human rights law. Nevertheless, under no circumstances, the 
Operation Unified Protector could serve as an excuse for letting these people without 
assistance for ten days at the centre of the Mediterranean. There is a profound moral 
failure of the States and NATO in this regard, which should be underscored and 
hopefully avoided in future instances. 
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 See PACE Report, Summary.  
